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This paper offers a new way of assessing government transfer programs using a social welfare func-
tion framework. It demonstrates how one can use social welfare functions to measure such programs’ 
efficiency without requiring the specification of a poverty line or particular poverty measures. The 
paper introduces three alternative principles of targeting, which provide a basis for measuring program 
efficiency. By applying the methodology developed in this paper, we compare the targeting efficiencies 
of 44 countries, which include both middle and high-income countries.
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1. iNtroductioN
Assessing the social welfare effects of government transfer programs has import-
ant implications for addressing income inequality and improving social welfare. In 
many developed countries, governments follow redistributive policies to reduce 
inequality (Kuznets, 1955; Baymul and Sen, 2019). A large number of developing 
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countries also invest in a variety of social programs to reduce poverty. The World 
Bank Report entitled “The State of Social Safety Nets 2015” concluded that almost 
1.9 billion people are now beneficiaries of government transfer programs (Honorati 
et al., 2015). Governments use redistributive policies, including progressive taxation 
and welfare programs expenditures, to reduce poverty and, more generally, enhance 
people’s welfare (Kakwani et al., 2019; Kakwani, Li, Wang and Wu, 2019).
A government levies taxes that it then spends on welfare programs. The pro-
gressivity of taxation and its implications for social welfare has been researched 
extensively in the literature.1 However, the progressivity and the welfare implica-
tions of social transfers have not been well examined. This paper fills in this gap.
This paper offers a new perspective on assessing government programs using 
a framework based on social welfare functions.2 Improving targeting accuracy and 
program efficiency is crucial for the programs to achieve their intended objectives 
of alleviating poverty and reducing inequality. This paper demonstrates how we 
can use social welfare functions to measure program efficiency without specifying 
a poverty line or poverty measures.
In the tax literature, A.C. Pigou (1928) first proposed the precise definition of 
tax progressivity in his book, Public Finance,3 where he argues that a tax structure 
is progressive if  the average tax rate rises as income increases. This definition of 
progressivity is consistent with the familiar and much-researched progressive tax 
principle that “richer people must pay taxes at higher rates.”4 Following this 
Principle, Kakwani (1977) developed a measure of tax progressivity, popularly 
known as the Kakwani index, widely used in the analysis of equity in taxation 
(Kakwani, 1984, Gerber et al., 2020).
Government transfer programs aim to help those in need. For example, safety- 
net programs transfer cash to the poor, who cannot typically meet their basic needs. 
The problem is that there exists no formal principle of progressivity of transfers in 
the literature to evaluate government transfers. We cannot apply the same Principle 
of tax progressivity on government transfers. In this paper, we derive a new mea-
sure of government transfers’ progressivity based on the principle “the richer peo-
ple should receive fewer benefits.” We can interpret this measure as the gain (loss) 
of social welfare due to transfers’ progressivity (regressivity).
In this paper, we have extended the idea of the social rate of return (SRR) 
developed by Kakwani and Son (2016) to evaluate welfare programs. All welfare 
programs incur costs and ought to be judged based on how much social welfare 
1See Kakwani and Son (forthcoming) for a review of this literature.
2Our paper deals with an important policy issue concerning how the government can target the 
poor employing a social welfare framework that does not require specifying a poverty line. Hence, our 
focus in this paper is essentially on social welfare functions. We could have supplemented the analysis 
by using other statistical tools such as means, Gini coefficients, concentration ratios, moment estimates 
and stochastic dominance (Handcock and Morris, 1999; Durlauf and Quah, 2002; Carneiro et al., 
2003) or indulged in a discussion of the technical debates about Sen’s SWF, but the inclusion of these, 
although useful, would be likely to divert attention away from the main policy focus of the paper.
3See Dalton (1936) and Musgrave and Thin (1948) for other alternative definitions of tax 
progressivity.
4See Blum and Kalven (1953) and Bos and Felderer (1989) for discussion of a range of politically 
and economically relevant facets. Kakwani and Lambert (1998) defined equity in taxation by means of 
three axioms, of which this progressive principle is one of them.
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they generate compared to their operational costs. The SRR measures how much 
welfare programs generate social welfare as a percentage of the program’s total 
cost. There are two types of costs associated with the running of a program. One 
is the amount of money that the program transfers to beneficiaries, and the other 
is the administrative cost.5 SRR incorporates both kinds of program costs.
Since many social programs aim to target the poor, it is essential to link 
between targeting the poor and the SRR approach. We link the two by introducing 
three alternative principles of targeting. The first Principle relates to the universal 
basic income (UBI) approach, which has recently become a focus of public debate.6 
A critical policy question we address in this paper is under what circumstances a 
government should adopt the universal basic income scheme over the alternative 
methods of targeting the poor. The second Principle relates to targeting the poor 
but with equal amounts of transfers to every beneficiary. Our third Principle relates 
to perfect targeting so that the program lifts all the poor out of poverty.
Policymakers are often interested in knowing which targeting principle they 
should adopt to achieve the maximum efficiency in their welfare programs. We 
answer this question by comparing the SRR of a given transfer program against 
the three principles. We can also employ this methodology to compare the efficacy 
of different types of programs operating in a country.
We then apply this measurement framework to make international com-
parisons of welfare programs’ efficacy using income distribution data from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Data Base for 44 middle and high-income coun-
tries. This cross-country analysis shows that governmental transfers can explain 
the Kuznets curve, implying that inequality increases at the initial development 
stage. Then, inequality reduces when countries develop at a later stage. Our empir-
ical results also show that richer countries often have more efficient transfer pro-
grams and achieve more significant poverty reduction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section  2 discusses the Gini 
social welfare function; Section 3 describes the method of assessing the impacts 
of government programs on social welfare; Section 4 presents three targeting prin-
ciples; Section  5 provides the results and analysis of an international compari-
son; Section 6 provides a rank correlation analysis to show the role of government 
transfer in explaining the Kuznets curve. Section 7 concludes and discusses possi-
ble policy implications.
5Taxation provides revenue to the government, which it spends on a variety of government opera-
tions, including on welfare programs. There can be economic costs if  there is a distortionary tax. There 
is substantive literature on optimal taxation that deals with the loss of welfare due to distortionary 
taxes. This literature has failed to provide a clear guideline on how progressive the taxes should be (for 
example, see Villamil et al., 2019 for a discussion of this). This paper focuses on the progressivity of 
government welfare transfers and their impact on social welfare. An integrated tax and benefit system 
could be evaluated but in this article (for example, see Caminada et al., 2019), we separate these and 
only look at the benefits system because for typically policy making purposes these are two different 
aspects of government finance that are administered separately. We have assumed that the revenue col-
lected from taxation is given exogenously to the government to spend on welfare programs. In this 
paper, we are dealing with the tradeoffs between the administrative costs and to what extent the govern-
ment should target the poor to increase the program efficiency. The issue is vital in the understanding 
of the effectiveness of government welfare programs on people’s welfare.
6For example, Ozler (2017) argues that the relative performance of UBI makes it appealing for 
consideration, given the poor performance of methods to target the poor in developing countries,
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2. a giNi Social welfare fuNctioN
In this paper, we use the Gini social welfare function to analyze government 
welfare programs’ progressivity. In this section, we discuss the foundation of the 
Gini social welfare function.
Suppose income x is a random variable with density function f (x), then, a 
general form of the Gini social welfare function proposed by Sen (1974, 1976, 





 is the vector of incomes of all n persons in society. 
The social welfare function in (2.1) is the weighted average of income levels; v (x, x̃) 
is the weight attached to income x in given income distribution x̃. The total weight 
in the domain of x must add up to 1:
In an egalitarian social welfare function, the poorer people get a higher weight 
than richer ones. It implies that v (x, x̃) must decrease monotonically with x. 
Further, note that weight v (x, x̃) is a function of the whole income distribution 
vector x̃, and not just of income x. This social welfare function is interdependent 
because each person’s utility depends not only on her income, but also on other 
persons’ incomes in society. Atkinson’s (1970) well-known social welfare function, 
derived from the concept of an equally distributed equivalent level of income, is 
additively separable, whereby every person’s utility depends only on her consump-
tion, and hence, is more restrictive.7
However, people compare their welfare with others in society and feel rela-
tively deprived if  their welfare is lower. To capture the idea of relative deprivation, 
Sen (1974) assumed that the weight function v (x, x̃) to depend on the ranking of 
all individuals in society. A basic intuition behind the rank ordering is that the 
lower a person is on a welfare scale, the higher this person’s sense of deprivation. 
Thus, Sen postulated that the weight on income level x should depend on the pro-
portion of persons in society who are richer than the person with income x in the 
given income vector x̃. Based on this formulation, the weight function v (x, x̃) is 
given by









v (x, x̃) f (x) dx = 1
7Sen’s social welfare function is quasi-concave, and depends on the ranking of individuals. It nicely 
captures the relative deprivation suffered by individuals. An essential feature of this function is that it 
analyzes how different targeting methods can change the rankings of individuals that lead to a loss of 
social welfare. If  the social welfare function is utilitarian in which every person has the same utility 
function, it will be consistent with the third-order dominance, when the utility function has positive first 
order and third-order derivatives and negative second-order derivatives. However, the utilitarian social 
welfare function with everyone having the same utility function is highly restrictive. Sen’s social welfare 
function is more general in the sense that it is interdependent, and not additive separable.
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where F (x) is the probability distribution function. [1 − F (x)] is the proportion 
of people who have income higher than x. Note that the sum of weights over the 
whole population adds up to 1:
Substituting (2.3) into (2.1) gives Sen’s social welfare function as
Arranging the population in ascending order of their pre-transfer income, we 
can define the Lorenz curve L (p) as the income share of the bottom p percent of 
the population. The Gini index, a widely used measure of inequality, is defined as 
one minus twice the area under the Lorenz curve. Following Kakwani (1980), the 
Gini index is written as
Combining (2.5) and (2.6) gives the Gini social welfare function as
where  is the mean income of a society, commonly used as a measure of society’s 
average standard of living. The Gini index is interpreted as the proportional loss 
of social welfare due to inequality in society.
The Gini social welfare function in (2.7) is homogeneous of degree 1, imply-
ing that if  everyone’s incomes increase by the same proportion, social welfare also 
increases by the same proportion. The inequality measure implicit in such a wel-
fare function is a relative measure of inequality, implying that inequality remains 
unchanged if  the same proportion alters every income.
3. impact of goverNmeNt traNSferS oN Social welfare
The governments, through their welfare programs, aim to enhance people’s 
welfare. Suppose a government program transfers an average of one unit of income 
to every person in the population. How much will the increase in per person social 
welfare in society? This section attempts to answer this question.
Suppose y is the post-transfer or gross income of an individual defined by





2 [1 − F (x)] f (x) dx = 1


















(2.7) W =  (1 −G)
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where x is the pre-transfer or market income, b (x) is the transfer received by the 
individual with income x.
The mean gross income is given by
where 
_
b is the per-person government transfer going to the population. Denoting 
Gx and Gy as the Gini indices of the pre- and post-transfer incomes, respectively, 
then, the social welfare functions of the pre-and post-transfer as obtained from 
(2.7) are given by
and
respectively.
Arranging the population in ascending order of their pre-transfer income, we 
can define the concentration curve of the post-transfer income, denoted by Cy(p) 
as the share of the post-transfer income of the bottom p percent of the popula-
tion. The concentration index of the post-transfer income denoted by Cy is then 
defined as one minus twice the area under the concentration curve Cy(p). Note that 
Cy = Gy, only if  the individuals have the same ranking when arranged by x and y. 
If  the welfare transfers change the ranking of individuals, then, following Kakwani 
(1980), Cy < Gy. Similarly, we define the concentration index of transfers Cb as one 
minus twice the area under the concentration curve of transfers when the individ-
uals are arranged in ascending order of the pre-transfer income.
Applying Theorem 8.5 from Kakwani (1980)8 on (3.1) gives
which on substituting into (3.3) and (3.4) yields



















8Theorem 8.5 from Kakwani (1980) states that, if  g (x) =
∑k
i= 1
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where B is the change in social welfare when the government transfers an average 
of one unit of transfer to the population. B is the average social return from one 
unit of government transfer. When B > 1, the social gain is higher than the money 
spent on transfers.
Suppose the first term in the right-hand side of (3.6) is negative. In that case, it 
means the program transfers change individuals’ ranking, which can happen when 
the transfers make some poorer individuals richer and the more affluent individu-
als poorer. The change in ranking contributes to the loss of social welfare.
The government transfers are said to be progressive if  the poorer individuals 
receive more benefits than the richer ones. According to Kakwani’s (1980) Corollary 
8.1, the transfers are progressive if  Cb < 0. Thus, equation (3.6) demonstrates that 
progressive transfers contribute to an increase in social welfare. Similarly, if  trans-
fers are regressive when Cb > 0, the more impoverished persons receiving fewer 
benefits than the richer ones, the program reduces social welfare. If  everyone in 
society gets the same transfer, equal to one unit of transfer, there will not be any 
change in ranking, so equation (3.6) shows that social welfare will increase by one 
unit per person.
A social transfer program is associated with two types of costs: the amount 
of money transferred to beneficiaries and the administrative cost. The transfer of 
funds to households has a direct impact on people’s welfare. Although the admin-
istrative cost does not directly affect people’s welfare, it is an essential expendi-
ture to deliver funds to the program beneficiaries efficiently. We may assume that 
the administrative cost is proportional to the amount of funds transferred to the 
households for simplicity. Suppose the administrative cost is ∈% of the transfers 
delivered to the beneficiary households, then, the average program cost will be 
given by (1+ ∈) b, which is the per capita program expenditure by the government. 
Thus, equation (3.6) adjusted for the administrative cost will be given by
R is the money metric social welfare contributed by the program as the pro-
portion of the program cost. R measures the social rate of return (SRR), defined 
as the increase of social welfare for the average one unit of the program cost per 
person. When R > 1, the social return from a program is higher than its cost.
For example, suppose the program transfers $100 million to households, and 
the administrative cost is 5 percent of funds transferred to the beneficiary house-
holds, then, the total cost of the program will be $105 million, and if  the increased 
social welfare in monetary units is $120 million, the total return of this program is 
120
105
= 1.14. Thus, the social rate of return (SRR) equals 14 percent. The policymak-
ers’ social objective should be to maximize the SRR. The SRR will be optimized 
when the program is run efficiently with a low administrative cost. If  the program 
is well-targeted to the lower income individual, it contributes to higher social wel-
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4. three targetiNg priNcipleS
The previous section presented a social welfare framework to calculate social 
rates of return; the higher the SRR, the better is the targeting of the individuals 
with incomes at the lower end of the income distribution, and the more efficient is 
the social transfer programs.
The evaluation of programs, as commonly done, is always based on some pov-
erty measures. The construction of poverty measures requires the specification of 
the poverty line, the threshold income below which a person is poor. In this paper, 
we propose an evaluation method that avoids the contentious issue of setting pov-
erty lines for different countries. We achieve this objective by calculating the SRR 
through three targeting principles.
4.1. Universal Basic Income
Principle I The benefits received by a person with income x is given by
where 
_
b is the average transfers going to the population.
Principle 1 is derived from a universal basic income (UBI) scheme, a form of 
social security in which all individuals in society receive the same transfer from the 
government. This idea ultimately gets rid of the targeting problem for all social 
transfers. The poor and the rich are all equal beneficiaries of social programs (see, 
for example, Hanna and Olken, 2018).
Using the Gini social welfare function in (2.5) on (4.1), it is easy to show that
where W∗
1
 is the social welfare of the post-transfer income under the UBI scheme. 
Suppose the administrative cost is ∈1% of the funds transferred to the beneficiaries, 






b. Thus, using (4.1), 
the money metric measure of social welfare contributed by the universal basic 
income scheme as the proportion of the total program cost is given by
which demonstrates that the SRR for the universal basic income scheme will always 
be negative if  the administrative cost is positive. The magnitude of it will depend 
on the administrative costs of delivering transfers to the population.
The efficiency of the government program can now be defined as
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where R is the social rate of return of the current transfer program as in (3.7) and 







which implies that the current government program is more efficient than the 
untargeted UBI scheme because it generates higher social welfare for every unit of 
money per person spent on the program.
The government program may not always produce a higher SRR than the 
UBI scheme because (1) it may not have progressive transfers, and (2) it may have 
a higher administrative cost. If  a program is well-targeted to the poor, and at the 
same time, it does not incur a too high administrative cost, the program will pro-
duce higher social welfare than the UBI scheme. Thus, E1 provides an empirical test 
for the efficiency of the program relative to the UBI.
4.2. Equal Subsidies for the Poor
Suppose instead of giving equal transfers to everyone in the society; the 
government provides the same amount of transfers to everyone belonging to the 
bottom p percent of the population. Suppose xp is the market income of an indi-
vidual at the p th percentile, then, xp = z will be the poverty line for that country. 
Note that we are not specifying any pre-determined poverty line. We identify the 
bottom p percent of the population as poor given 
_







 given in (4.12). Thus, in a sense, the poverty line is determined 
endogenously.

















the program, and the non-poor do not receive any transfers. This Principle focuses 
on the welfare of the poor and is in line with the concept of shared prosperity, as 
discussed in Narayan et al. (2013), Dollar et al. (2015), and Shen et al. (forthcom-






b1 if x≤ z





b1 if x≤ z
x if x> z
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 67, Number 4, December 2021
1014
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
Under this Principle, those non-poor people whose income is only just above 
the poverty line will not receive any transfer. Some poor below the poverty line 
before transfer may after the transfer cross the poverty line and become non-poor. 
Their income may exceed those of non-poor who did not receive any transfer. 
Therefore, under this Principle, there may be a change in ranking between the pre-
and post-transfer income distributions. This would result in a loss of social wel-
fare. Villamil (forthcoming) argues that the transfer payment mechanism should be 
designed to satisfy the Fairness Axiom; i.e. a transfer payment system should cause 
no re-ranking in people’s living standards. This requirement is applied in taxation 
literature, and it is consistent with Axiom 3 in Kakwani and Lambert (1998).
The Gini social welfare function in (2.5) satisfying Principle II yields
W∗
2
 is the social welfare of the post-transfer income under Principle II and Cy2 
and Gy2 are the concentration and Gini indices, respectively, of the post-transfer 
income satisfying Principle II. The first term on the right-hand side of (4.7) shows 
that the change in ranking under Principle II reduces social welfare.
Using (4.2) and (4.7) yields
Intuitively we would assume that, when there is no administrative cost, if  the 
program is targeted to the poor with the same transfers, the social welfare would 
be higher than that of the untargeted UBI scheme. Equation (4.8) shows that this 
assumption might not hold when there is a change in ranking. If  there is no change 
in ranking, the second term on the right-hand side of (4.8) demonstrates that the 
program targeted to the poor would be welfare superior.
Suppose the administrative cost is ∈2% of  the funds transferred to the bene-
ficiaries under the targeted program satisfying Principle II, then, using (4.7), the 
money metric measure of social welfare contributed by the targeted program as the 
proportion of the total program cost is given by
The efficiency of the government program relative to targeted program satis-
fying Principle II can now be defined as
If  E2 is greater (less) than 1, it implies that the government program is more 
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4.3. Perfect Targeting (Filling the Poverty Gap)
Not all the poor have the same market income. A perfectly targeted program 
will be the one that fills the income gap of the poor individuals from the poverty 
line so that the income of every one of the poor is lifted to the poverty line. This 
targeting scheme would meet the strongest requirement, which we present below 
as Principle III.
Principle III The benefit received by a person with market income x is given by
which gives
where p is the mean of the poor. We solve this equation for p given 
_
b.
The post-transfer income under this Principle will be given by
Principle III requires that all poor have the post-transfer income equal to the 
poverty line, and the non-poor have the same gross income as their before transfer 
income. It is easy to verify that under this Principle, there will be no change in 
ranking between the market and gross income distributions.
We can show that the Gini social welfare function in (2.5) yields
where W∗
3
 is the social welfare function of the post-transfer income under the per-
fectly targeted program as described in Principle III, and Gp is the Gini index of the 
market income among the poor.
Note that
Since the first term in the right-hand side of (4.15) is negative, it follows that 
the perfectly targeted program yields higher social welfare than Principle II, where 




(z−x) if x≤ z
0 if x> z






z if x≤ z














+ p2𝜇pGp > 0
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Suppose the administrative cost is ∈3% of the funds transferred to the benefi-
ciaries under the perfectly targeted program, using (4.14), the money metric social 
welfare contributed by the perfectly targeted program as the proportion of the 
total program cost is given by
We can now define the efficiency of the government program relative to the 
perfectly targeted program satisfying Principle III as
If  E3 is greater (less) than 1, it implies that the government program is more 
(less) efficient than the perfectly targeted program to the poor (as in Principle III). 
If  E3 > 1, we can classify the government program as the most valuable.
4.4. Administrative costs further discussed
Administrative costs vary from one program to another and even for similar 
programs in different countries. More importantly, they depend on how well the 
targeting method is applied. The universal basic scheme does not have to identify 
the poor, so it should incur the least administrative cost. The targeted programs 
require more resources to identify the poor so that they will incur higher adminis-
trative costs. The perfectly targeted program should bear the most administrative 
cost because it requires every poor individual’s market income. Thus, the adminis-
trative costs should satisfy the inequality ∈1 < ∈2 < ∈3.
This paper has developed a methodology to calculate the social welfare contri-
butions of different targeting principles. Still, we need to know the administrative 
costs of targeting methods seldom available to researchers in practice. Suppose the 
administrative costs are insignificant relative to the size of the program. In that 
case, we may judge the program’s efficacy by ignoring these costs and only focus 
on the social welfare contributions of different targeting methods. However, the 
administrative costs can be significant for some programs. We do not know a priori 
how high the administrative costs are. And hence, policymakers cannot ignore the 
administrative cost of running the programs. They can judge the efficacy of target-
ing methods only when they know administrative costs.
Due to scarce resources, policymakers’ objective should be to design a pro-
gram that generates maximum social welfare at a fixed cost. When policymakers 
create a welfare program, they should make estimates of administrative costs of 
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the right-hand side of this inequality is the social rate of return of targeting 





. If  inequality 
in (4.18) is satisfied, targeting the poor would be more efficient than the UBI 
scheme because it will generate higher social welfare at a given cost. If  the condi-
tion in (4.18) is not satisfied, providing transfers to everyone will be preferred. The 
proponents of universal basic income must test this rule before promoting univer-
sal basic income.
Similarly, if
then the policy of perfect targeting will be more efficient than targeting the poor 






5. iNterNatioNal compariSoNS of goverNmeNt traNSfer programS
5.1. Setting the Stage
Almost all developed countries have made substantial investments in safety- 
net programs. These are targeted programs designed to help low-income and vul-
nerable populations. They provide support to low-income families, unemployed, 
students, the elderly, etc. Generally, the safety-net programs are means-tested, tar-
geted to the low-income population, but the degree of targeting varies substan-
tially in different countries. From the policy perspective, a pertinent question is: 
what targeting method should be employed in designing a welfare program?
This section provides an international comparison of safety-net programs 
using the measures developed in the previous sections. We have utilized income 
distribution data for 44 middle and high-income countries. These data are obtained 
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2020) Database, which has the most 
extensive available income database from about 50 countries in Europe, North 
America, Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Australia. The household surveys of 44 
selected in this study were conducted around 2013.
The LIS acquires micro-level data sets to provide information on income, 
wealth, employment, and demographics at the household level. The primary 
sources of these data sets are the household income surveys conducted by national 
statistical authorities or research institutes. The LIS harmonizes them into a 
common framework to enable cross-national comparisons. The data sets contain 
household and person-level data on labor income, capital income, pensions, public 
social benefits (excluding pensions), and private transfers, as well as taxes and con-
tributions, demography, employment, and expenditures.
We have made comparisons of safety-net programs across countries for which 
comparable data on government transfers were available. In Table 1, we show the 
detailed income sources and categories used in this study. This paper focuses on 
public transfer programs, which includes all the public social benefits but excludes 
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populations with relatively low income. They only constitute the safety-net pro-
grams. All other income sources, such as factor income, pension income, and pri-
vate transfers, are included in market income.9
Gross household income is the total monetary and non-monetary (such as 
in-kind) current income. It includes market income and government transfers to 
households. We have equivalized household incomes and transfers by dividing by 
the number of household members’ square roots. This equalizing procedure takes 
into account the different needs of household members and economies of scale 
that occur in larger households. Income and transfers are available from household 
surveys in a local currency, but relative prices significantly impact cross-country 
income levels (Inklaar and Rao, 2017). To make international comparisons, we 
converted local currency into international dollars based on the 2011 purchasing 
power parity (PPP). Thus, income and transfers are comparable across countries.
5.2. Empirical Analysis for Ten Countries
In this sub-section, we provide a detailed analysis of ten selected countries 
out of 44 countries. We have not applied any rigorous criterion in choosing these 
countries except that they are large economies, and our objective is mainly illus-
trative. Table 2 presents empirical results for the ten countries selected. Results for 
the remaining countries are in the Appendix. Interested readers can use the same 
analytical framework to understand and explain those countries.
5.2.1. The Scale and Progressivity of Transfers
The average standard of living is measured by the per equivalent adult (house-
hold size-adjusted) gross income in 2011 PPP. According to this criterion, India is 
the poorest country on the list, with per equivalent adult annual income of $3,781. 
The wealthiest nation is the United States, with an income of $46,962 per capita. 
The countries spend different amounts on their safety-net programs. A country’s 
commitment towards providing a safety-net to its people can be roughly measured 
by the transfers as the percentage of household income. We could expect that the 
more prosperous countries would have a more significant commitment to safety- 
net programs than the poorer ones, but the results suggest that this is not the case. 
The USA, being the wealthiest country on the list, spends only 2.42 percent on 
safety-net programs. The European countries have a much higher commitment to 
providing a safety-net to their people. The United Kindom, France, and Finland 
spend 8.75, 7.94, and 8.10 percent of income on transfers, respectively.
The redistribution effect of programs is measured by the change in the Gini 
index of pre- and post-program income distributions.10 In all countries, the 
programs contribute to a reduction in the Gini index. The countries with a higher 
9We have not included those other types of transfers in our analysis because they generally are not 
part of the welfare programs in many countries. It was also not feasible to evaluate partial redistributive 
effects of expenditures on different programs from the data, as that would imply a sequence of the 
transfer policies. The countries in our sample had a variety of programs but the detailed expenditures 
on individual programs were not available in the data set.
10Redistribution effect = (Gini index without transfers—Gini index with transfers)/Gini index 
without transfers.
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commitment to welfare programs achieve a higher reduction in inequality due to 
their programs.
The total gain (loss) of welfare is the sum of three components. They are 
social welfare gains (losses) due to (1) horizontal inequity, (2) progressivity, and 
(3) equal transfers. There would be welfare loss when there is horizontal inequality 
resulting from a change in the rank of income among households. Social welfare 
would increase when everyone receives one unit of transfer in line with our first 
Principle of the universal basic income approach. The more progressive a transfer 
program is, the higher the welfare gain will result. The government transfers to 
households are said to be progressive if  the poor receive more transfers than the 
rich. The degree of progressivity is measured by the gain in social welfare when, on 
average, one dollar of transfers going to households.
We illustrate this using the United Kingdom as an example. In the U.K., the 
increase in social welfare is 0.57 cents due to progressivity for every dollar of the 
transfer, and the gain due to equal transfer is 1. But there is a loss of social welfare 
equal to 9 cents due to horizontal inequity (when there is a change in ranking). The 
total gain in social welfare in the United Kingdom is $1.48 per person when the 
government transfers one dollar to every person. Thus, the social program gener-
ates a 48 percent social rate of return. In India, the social return rate is 5 percent 
because the increase in social welfare due to the programs is only marginally higher 
than the households’ transfers.
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of social rates of return in various countries. The 
social programs in the United Kingdom produce the highest social rate of return, 
followed by Australia, Germany, and Finland. Following this method, a social rate 
of return can be compiled for all the countries to assess social programs’ efficiency 
and effectiveness.
Figure 1. Social Rates of Return of Welfare Programs in Ten Countries (%) [Colour figure can be 
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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5.2.2. Evaluating the Efficiency of the Transfer Programs
The UBI scheme has been attracting much attention recently. Under this 
scheme, all individuals in society receive the same amount of transfer from the gov-
ernment. As pointed out, the World Bank is now promoting this idea on its blog 
"Basic Income: Can we transfer our way out of poverty?" This scheme was recently 
tested in Finland. Hanna and Olken (2018) admit that government-led anti- 
poverty programs have a crucial role in eliminating extreme poverty worldwide, 
but question the form of these transfers, and in particular, whether they should be 
universal or targeted more narrowly to the poor.
Therefore, it is essential to know how the current programs perform compared 
to the universal basic income. To answer this question, we calculated R/R1,11 the 
ratio of social welfare generated by the program to that under the UBI scheme with 
the same amount of transfers to households. If  this ratio is higher (lower) than 1, 
the program performs better (worse) than the UBI scheme. From Table  2 and 
Figure 1, we can see that for Russia and India, this ratio is 1.02 and 1.05, respec-
tively, implying that welfare programs in these two countries only marginally per-
form better than the UBI scheme. But for all other countries in our sample, the 
ratio varies from 1.26 to 1.48, significantly higher than 1, from which we conclude 
that the currently running targeted programs in developed countries perform con-
siderably better than the universal basic income.
This conclusion is valid because the programs’ administrative cost is the same 
as that of the UBI scheme. This condition is unlikely to hold because the targeted 
programs incur higher administrative costs than the untargeted programs. If  the 
actual administrative costs are known through small scale trials in a country, a 
more meaningful comparison can be made, before deciding which program to 
adopt.
The primary aim of social welfare programs is to reduce poverty and, more 
generally, to increase social welfare. So, the programs are designed to target the 
poor. Various countries adopt different targeting methods to transfer benefits to 
the poor. There are two distinct issues in designing targeting programs: (1) identi-
fying the poor, and (2) how much transfers should be given to them so that their 
minimum basic needs are met.
Our targeting principle II is related to making equal transfers to those who 
have been identified as poor. We want to know how social programs in different 
countries have performed against Principle II. i.e. how they perform compared to 
the counterfactual scenario where the program beneficiaries are only the poor. At 
the same time, the non-poor do not receive any benefit from the program. As dis-
cussed in subsection 4.2, a program is more efficient than under Principle II if  
R/R2 > 1.
11The LIS data used in the paper is micro level household data, where the information on adminis-
trative costs of the social programs is not available. As we have emphasized that the administrative costs 
are essential in evaluating the programs, but a hard fact is that none of the welfare programs imple-
mented in the world provide information on administrative costs. Even the World Bank Report entitled 
“The State of Social Safety Nets 2015” does not discuss administrative costs. We have, however, pointed 
out this as an important area and to suggest potential methods that can be used, and have attempted to 
draw some broad conclusions from our empirical application without the administrative data.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 67, Number 4, December 2021
1023
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
In global poverty studies, it is often the norm to follow the same exogenously 
given poverty line, such as the (PPP) $1.9 a day for all the countries. Since we com-
pare the efficiency across countries with widely different living standards, we can-
not use the same exogenously determined poverty line for all countries. Our model 
determines the poverty line endogenously based on government subsidy incurred 
on welfare programs in different countries.
The results in Table 2 show that the indicator R/R2 is less than 1 for all coun-
tries in our sample. The poor belong to the bottom p percent of the population. 
None of the countries can correctly identify the poor belonging to the poorest 
p percent population. This revelation is significant because safety-net programs 
were supposed to alleviate or at least reduce poverty. For instance, the value of 
the indicator for India is only 0.56, signifying a very low targeting efficiency of 
social programs in India. The indicator has the highest value of 0.90 for the United 
Kingdom. Australia is the second-best on the list with a targeting efficiency of 
0.84. The United States has considerably lower efficiency at 0.76.
Principle III implies perfect targeting whereby every poor person’s income is 
lifted to the poverty line, meaning that the programs are designed to eliminate pov-
erty. The program would be more efficient than perfect targeting (Principle III) if  
R/R3 > 1. As expected, the results in Table 2 show that this targeting indicator is 
less than 1 for all countries in our sample.
The results also show that R∕R3 < R∕R2 for all countries in our sample. The 
efficiency of the United Kingdom reduces from 0.90 to 0.82. This result is expected 
because targeting Principle III is a stronger requirement than Principle III, so it 
achieves higher social welfare. These conclusions are valid only under the condi-
tion that the program’s administrative costs are the same as those under Principles 
II and III. This assumption is unlikely to hold because targeting the poor with 
equal transfers or perfect targeting incurs higher administrative costs.
How should policymakers base their targeting strategy? First, they have to 
determine the administrative costs of different targeting scenarios, as outlined by 
the three principals at the program design phase. Once this is done, then, the empir-
ical results in Table 2 can help to make this decision. R2/R1 indicates how much 
social welfare is generated if  the program targets the poor with equal transfers 
relative to no targeting scenario. Everyone in society receives equal transfers so that 
the total transfer cost is the same. For instance, ratio R2/R1 for Australia, from 
Table 2, is equal to 1.71, which implies that targeting the poor generates 71 percent 
higher social welfare than no targeting. If  the cost of targeting the poor relative to 
no-targeting is significantly less than 71 percent, it would then be a more efficient 
strategy to target the poor than no targeting. A similar interpretation applies to the 
ratio R3/R2, which compares the social welfare efficiency of perfect targeting rela-
tive to equal transfers to the poor. Thus, the empirical results presented in Table 2 
can guide policymakers on what targeting strategy they could adopt.
6. raNk correlatioNS aNalySiS
An important issue in development economics is whether there is a relationship 
between development and income inequality. In his pioneering paper, Kuznets (1955) 
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proposed an inverted U-shaped curve of economic development. At low levels of 
economic development, income inequality increases, but inequality begins to decline 
when it reaches a threshold level. He explained this curve’s existence in terms of struc-
tural transformation, which takes place due to migration from rural to urban sectors.
Another possible explanation of the Kuznets phenomenon could be that as 
countries become wealthier, their commitment to social programs also increases. 
At a later phase of economic development, as governments follow redistributive 
policies combining progressive taxation with welfare spending, inequality may 
decrease (Baymul and Sen, 2019). We argue that the decrease in inequality with 
economic development is not a natural result but a consequence of government 
redistribution policies. For example, Caminada et al. (2019), Wang and Piesse 
(2010), and Wang et al. (2012) show that government transfers played more signifi-
cant roles than taxes in narrowing income inequality. In this section, we first clarify 
some theoretical issues and, then, look at the empirical results.
Whether the Kuznets process holds for any particular economy depends on 
the specific characteristics of the structural transformation path that the economy 
follows (Baymul and Sen, 2019). The relationships involving social welfare func-
tions and progressivity of government transfers are often non-linear. The correla-
tion coefficients that measure deviation from linearity may invariably show that 
the variables are not significantly related or weakly related. Given the non-linear 
nature of variables, linear regressions can be estimated after applying a non-linear 
transformation to the original data.
Because the exact forms of non-linear relationships are not known, Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient is used to test whether there is a significant relationship 
between variables.12 The following test statistic is used to test the significance of 
relationships.
12The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is a nonparametric measure of rank correlation, 
often used in statistics to assess how well the relationship between two variables can be described using 








TABLE 3   
SpearmaN’S raNk correlatioNS
Evaluation Indicators Per Equivalent Adult Income
Program transfers as a share of income 0.60*
Gini index without the program −0.46*
Gini index with the program −0.57*
Redistribution effect of the program −0.63*
Progressivity of transfers −0.47*
Program efficiency relative to targeting Principle I 0.46*
Program efficiency relative to targeting Principle II 0.62*
Program efficiency relative to targeting Principle III 0.57*
Note: Significant at the 1% level of significance.
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where r is the Spearman’s rank correlation and distributed approximately as 
Student’s t distribution with (n–2) degrees of freedom. This test procedure per-
forms better than the usual normal approximation.
The correlation analysis does not establish a causal relationship between the 
variables, which would require a highly complex general equilibrium model. Our 
aim is limited to determining whether there are significant monotonic relationships 
between variables.
We carried out the rank correlation analysis using data on 44 countries, with 
the statistical significance level set at 1%. If  rank correlation coefficients among the 
variables are statistically significant, we can conclude that their relationships would 
exist with a high degree of confidence.
Table 3 reports the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. As pointed out, 
we can measure the commitment to social programs by transfers to households as a 
share of their income. We note from Table 3 that the rank correlation between income 
and commitment is 0.6, which is significant at the 1 percent level of significance. This 
observation suggests that the wealthier a country, the higher is its social expenditure 
as the share of its income. We also find that all the other rank correlations reported 
in Table 3 are significant at the 1 percent significance level. These observations sug-
gest that social programs in wealthier countries have more progressive transfers that 
redistribute income to poorer households. The wealthier countries also have social 
programs that have higher efficiency in targeting the poor. Thus, the more effective 
redistributive welfare policies are important contributors in explaining the Kuznets’ 
phenomenon of reducing inequality when countries become more affluent.
7. coNcluSioNS
Social welfare programs’ effectiveness is essential for public policymakers in 
selecting a program based on the comparison with three targeting principles pro-
posed. This paper develops a social welfare framework for measuring government 
social programs’ impact on the welfare of the people and applies this set of eval-
uation measures to 44 countries to undertake an empirical evaluation and allow 
international comparison using LIS data.
We introduced the measurement of the social rate of return to the policy eval-
uation framework. The social rate of return approach enables a cross-country com-
parison of policy effectiveness and allows the decomposition of the efficiency into 
different effects. According to their social programs’ efficiency and effectiveness, a 
social rate of return index can be compiled for countries in the world. For example, 
countries such as the U.K. and Australia perform very well in this league table, but 
Russia and India perform very poorly. This social rate of return index can be an 
excellent index for assessing institutions and governance quality.
This paper also introduces relative efficiency in policy evaluation, enabling an 
assessment of a given program comparative to alternative targeting principles. We 
proposed three transfer principles and compared the current social programs in 
various countries against these principles. For example, the UBI scheme has been 
advocated primarily due to the advantage of its low administrative cost. However, 
it performs much worse than almost all other social welfare programs in all 44 
countries when the administrative cost is not considered.
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Even if  the UBI incurs lowers administrative costs than that of other pro-
grams, it is likely that the saved administrative cost by the UBI may not be enough 
to compensate for the social welfare loss caused by non-progressivity and other 
problems. Many developed countries such as the U.K. are doing very well now, 
so the need for adopting the UBI may not be necessary in light of the evidence 
presented in the paper.
The rank correlation analysis presented in the paper suggests that many 
high-income countries have lower inequality and higher redistribution effects, 
where they relatively spent a lot more money investing in social programs and with 
higher efficiency overall. Through the rank correlation analysis, we argue that one 
of the fundamental reasons for the second phase of the Kuznets’ inverted-U shape 
is not only a natural outcome of structural transformation but, more importantly, 
maybe due to the extensive commitment to social programs.
There are a couple of directions suggested for further research. First, a more 
accurate assessment of social programs and international comparisons can be con-
ducted when more detailed administrative costs become available. We have discussed 
the paper’s critical methodological issues, but we were unable to provide a more accu-
rate assessment of the programs without knowing their administrative costs. The 
administrative costs are seldom used to evaluate the efficiency of programs. In this 
paper, we have emphasized how crucial administrative cost in assessing the efficacy 
of programs. The World Bank Report entitled “The State of Social Safety Nets 2015” 
has provided a comprehensive compilation of welfare programs worldwide. Even this 
flagship publication does not incorporate any discussion of the administrative costs.
Second, the paper’s essential contribution has been to show how the idea of 
the social rate of return can be applied to evidence-based policy analysis that could 
improve the quality of institutions and governance. Future research into the devel-
opment of a social rate of return would provide concrete evidence for public poli-
cies’ effectiveness. It will incentivize nations to improve their welfare programs that 
play a crucial role in reducing poverty and inequality.
We have not discussed any non-income consideration in our analysis. For 
instance, as Sen (1987) famously points out, if  somebody is disabled, he might 
need a higher income to obtain the same quality of life. Therefore, if  two people 
are equally poor, but one is disabled, it is reasonable that the disabled should get 
a larger government transfer. The transfer programs must take into account the 
different needs of the people. However, if  we take into account the diverse needs of 
all people, the programs will become unmanageable. Many countries have separate 
programs providing transfers directly to the neediest, such as chronically sick or 
disabled persons. The idea of the social rate of return developed in the paper can 
apply to these programs also.
refereNceS
Atkinson, A., “On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2(3), 244–63, 1970.
Baymul, C. and K. Sen, “Kuznets Revisited: What Do We Know about the Relationship between 
Structural Transformation and Inequality?,” Asian Development Review, 36(1), 136–67, 2019.
Blum, W. J. and H. Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, Chicago University Press, 
Chicago, IL, 1953.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 67, Number 4, December 2021
1027
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
Bos, D. and B. Felderer, The Political Economy of Progressive Taxation, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1989.
Caminada, K., K. Goudswaard, C. Wang, and J. Wang, “Has the Redistributive Effect of Social 
Transfers and Taxes Changed Over Time Across Countries?,” International Social Security Review, 
72(1), 3–31, 2019.
Carneiro, P., K. T. Hansen, and J. J. Heckman, “Lawrence R. Klein Lecture Estimating Distributions 
of Treatment Effects with an Application to the Returns to Schooling and Measurement of the 
Effects of Uncertainty on College Choice,” International Economic Review, 44(2), 361–422, 2003.
Corder, G. W. and D. I. Foreman, Nonparametric Statistics: A Step-by-Step Approach, John Wiley & 
Sons, London, 2014.
Dalton, H., Principles of Public Finance, 9th ed., Routledge, London, 1936.
Dollar, D., T. Kleineberg, and A. Kraay, “Growth, Inequality and Social Welfare: Cross Country 
Evidence,” Economic Policy, 30(82), 335–77, 2015.
Durlauf, S. N. and D. Quah, “The New Empirics of Economic Growth,” in J. B. Taylor and M. 
Woodford (eds), Chapter 4 in Handbook of Macroeconomics, North Holland, Amsterdam, 2002.
Gerber, C., A. Klemm, L. Liu, and V. Mylonas, “Income Tax Progressivity: Trends and Implications,” 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 82(2), 365–86, 2020.
Handcock, M. S. and M. Morris, Relative Distribution Methods in the Social Sciences, Springer-Verlag, 
New York, 1999.
Hanna, R. and B. A. Olken, “Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty 
Programs in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(4), 201–26, 2018.
Honorati, M., U. Gentilini, and R. G. Yemtsov, The State of Social Safety Nets, World Bank Group, 
Washington, DC, 2015. http://docum ents.world bank.org/curat ed/en/41549 14679 94645 020/The-
state -of-socia l-safet y-nets-2015.
Inklaar, R. and D. S. P. Rao, “Cross-Country Income Levels Over Time: Did the Developing World 
Suddenly Become Much Richer?,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(1), 265–90, 
2017.
Kakwani, N., “Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison,” The Economic 
Journal, 87, 71–80, 1977.
   , Income Inequality and Poverty: Methods of Estimation and Policy Applications, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1980.
   , “On the Measurement of Tax Progressivity and Redistribution Effect of Taxes with Applications 
to Horizontal and Vertical Equity,” Advances in Econometrics, 3, 149–68, 1984.
Kakwani, N. and P. J. Lambert, “On Measuring Inequity in Taxation: A New Approach,” European 
Journal of Political Economy, 14(2), 369–80, 1998.
Kakwani, N., S. Li, X. Wang, and S. Wu, “Social Tensions in a Growing China,” The Manchester 
School, 87(2), 228–58, 2019.
Kakwani, N., S. Li, X. Wang, and M. Zhu, “Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Rural Minimum Living 
Standard Guarantee (Dibao) Program in China,” China Economic Review, 53(1), 1–14, 2019.
Kakwani, N. and H. Son, “Normative Measures of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison,” 
Journal of Income Inequality, forthcoming.
   , Social Welfare Functions and Development: Measurement and Policy Applications, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 2016.
Kuznets, S., “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” American Economic Review, 45(1), 1–28, 1955.
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Database. http://www.lisda tacen ter.org (multiple countries; 28th July 
2019—28th March 2020), LIS, Luxembourg.
Musgrave, R. A. and T. Thin, “Income Tax Progression, 1929–48,” Journal of Political Economy, 56, 
498–514, 1948.
Narayan, A., J. Saavedra-Chanduvi, and S. Tiwari, “Shared Prosperity: Links to Growth, Inequality 
and Inequality of Opportunity,” The World Bank Policy, Research Working Paper, 2013.
Ozler, B., “Fact Checking Universal Basic Income: Can We Transfer Our Way Out of Poverty?,” World 
Bank Blogs, February 27, 2017. https://blogs.world bank.org/impac teval uatio ns/fact-check ing-
unive rsal-basic -incom e-can-we-trans fer-our-way-out-poverty.
Pigou, A. C., A Study in Public Finance, Macmillan and Co., London, 1928.
Sen, A., “Informational Bases of Alternative Welfare Approaches: Aggregation of Income Distribution,” 
Journal of Public Economics, 3, 387–403, 1974.
   , “Real National Income,” The Review of Economic Studies, 43(1), 19–39, 1976.
   , “The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons. A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 
17, 1–45, 1979.
   , “The Standard of Living,” in G. Hawthorn (ed.), The Standard of Living (pp. 1–38), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
Shen, Y., S. Li, and X. Wang, “For Better For Worse? The Impacts of Two Tax Reforms on Inequality 
and Welfare in China,” China and World Economy, Forthcoming.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 67, Number 4, December 2021
1028
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
Spearman, C., “The Proof and Measurement of Association Between Two Things,” American Journal 
of Psychology, 15(1), 72–101, 1904.
Villamil, A. X. “The Political Foundation of Growth and Welfare Spending in China,” Journal of Public 
Economic Theory, Forthcoming.
Villamil, A., X. Wang, and N. Xue, “Higher Taxation for Fairer Redistribution? A Political Economy 
Model with Occupational Choice,” The University of Manchester, Working Paper, 2019.
Wang, C., K. Caminada, and K. Goudswaard, “The Redistributive Effect of Social Transfer Programs 
and Taxes: A Decomposition across Countries,” International Social Security Review, 65(3), 27–48, 
2012.
Wang, X. and J. Piesse, “Inequality and the Urban-rural Divide in China: Effects of Regressive 
Taxation,” China and World Economy, 18(6), 36–55, 2010.
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this 
article at the publisher’s web site:
Table A: Evaluation Indicators of Safety-net Programs for 44 Selected 
Countries
